The Epistemology of Testimony by Pritchard, Duncan
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Epistemology of Testimony
Citation for published version:
Pritchard, D 2004, 'The Epistemology of Testimony' Philosophical Issues, vol 14, no. 1, pp. 326-348. DOI:
10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00033.x
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00033.x
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Philosophical Issues
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the post-peer reviewed version of the following article: Pritchard, D. (2004) "The Epistemology of
Testimony", Philosophical Issues. 14, 1, p. 326-348; which has been published in final form at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00033.x
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONY
Duncan Pritchard
University of Stirling
1. The Epistemology of Testimony—Scylla and Charybdis
As the title of this piece indicates, my interest here is the epistemology
of testimony, or, more precisely, testimony-based belief. What I will be
canvassing is a certain form of pessimism about the justification we have
for this sort of belief.
Let us focus on what I take it is the paradigm case of testimony—the
intentional transfer of a belief from one agent to another, whether in the
usual way via a verbal assertion made by the one agent to the other, or by
some other means, such as through a note.1 So, for example, John says to
Mary that the house is on fire (or, if you like, ‘texts’ her this message on her
phone), and Mary, upon hearing this, forms the belief that the house is on
fire and consequently exits the building at speed. Clearly, a great deal of our
beliefs are gained via testimony, and if the epistemic status of our testimony-
based beliefs were to be called into question en masse, then this would
present us with quite a predicament. It is thus essential that we have some
plausible account of the epistemology of testimony. Our primary focus will
be on the justification for our testimony-based beliefs, though along the way
we will say a little about other relevant epistemic notions like epistemic
entitlement as well.
In what follows, we will call a ‘testimony-based belief’ (TBB) any belief
which one reasonably and directly forms in response to what one reasonably
takes to be testimony and which is essentially caused and sustained by
testimony. A few remarks about this characterisation of a TBB is in order.
To begin with, it is worth noting that whilst this formulation of a TBB
is quite permissive in that it allows that one can gain a TBB from a merely
apparent instance of testimony (so long as the agent’s judgement that it is an
instance of testimony is reasonably made), it is also somewhat restrictive in
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that it insists that the agent forming the belief must regard the belief as
testimony-based.2 In order to simplify matters, in what follows we will take
it for granted that the testimony in question is genuine and not merely
apparent, unless the discussion demands otherwise.
Second, the purpose of the clause ‘‘reasonably and directly’’ is to allow
that someone might legitimately draw a direct consequence from a testi-
monial assertion and that direct consequence still be regarded as a TBB. For
example, if you assert ‘‘P, and if P then Q’’, but do not also assert ‘‘Q’’, I
want to allow that one can legitimately form a belief not only in the
proposition asserted but also in Q and that this latter belief should also be
treated as a TBB. The belief needs to be directly formed since otherwise
other factors will inevitably be brought into play, such as memory.3
In contrast, third, the clause ‘‘essentially’’ is being used to put some
pressure in a more restrictive direction by ruling out cases where other (non-
testimonial) factors are playing a substantive role, either in the formation of
one’s belief or in the sustaining of that belief. For example, if I know from
my previous experience of dealings with you that you are a pathological liar,
and I hear you assert ‘‘P’’, then I might reasonably form the belief that
not-P. Such a belief would not be a TBB on this view because it essentially
rests not only on the instance of testimony in question but also on further
collateral information gained via observation.4
Fourth, the point that the belief must be sustained by testimony is
meant to rule out cases in which a belief is originally gained via testimony
but is later sustained by some other source of knowledge, such as observa-
tion. For example, once Mary sees for herself that the house is on fire we
would expect her belief that the house is on fire to be sustained by her
observation of the fire rather than by John’s testimony in this regard. By the
lights of the characterisation just offered, therefore, this belief would no
longer be a TBB.
Finally, it should be noted that this characterisation of TBBs allows
that a TBB might be based on more than one instance of testimony, and
that it might even be sustained by different instances of testimony over time.
That said, for the sake of simplicity our focus in what follows will be on the
basic case in this regard in which the agent forms a TBB on the basis of a
single instance of testimony.
The contemporary discussion of the epistemology of testimony has
tended to cluster around two opposing positions. On the one hand, there
are the reductionists who argue, roughly, that the justification of an agent’s
TBB is always dependent upon that agent possessing further independent
grounds—i.e., at the very least, grounds that are independent of the instance
of testimony in question.5 The standard story goes that this camp of
theorists gets their inspiration from Hume.6 In effect, the idea is that the
epistemic status of one’s TBBs can always be reduced to the epistemic status
of one’s non-TBBs, and this is why the bold formulation of the reductionist
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thesis is often known as global reductionism. We can formulate global
reductionism roughly as follows:
Global Reductionism
For all of one’s TBBs, if one’s TBB is justified, then one is able to offer
sufficient non-testimonial grounds in support of that TBB.
This formulation is rather vague of course, especially in its use of the
qualifier ‘‘sufficient’’, but it will do for our present purposes.
One can see the attraction of the view. Plausibly, the mere fact that
someone testifies that P is not a reason—or at least not a reason sufficient
for justification at any rate—for believing P. Instead, one must be in the
possession of further justifying grounds that are independent of this instance
of testimony. The problem is, of course, that if those further grounds are
themselves simply additional instances of testimony—e.g., someone else say-
ing that one can trust the person making the original assertion—then the issue
of one’s justification for holding the original TBB, far from being resolved,
simply gets moved one stage back on to the issue of one’s justification for
believing this further supporting TBB. The only way out of this chain of
justification is, it seems, to find adequate supporting grounds which are non-
testimonial, such as, say, one’s observation over time of the testimonial
reliability of the agent making the original assertion when it comes to the
target subject matter. Thus, if we are to have justification for our TBBs, then
that justification had better be reducible to a non-testimonial set of grounds.7
On the other side of the contemporary divide are the defaultists, or
credulists, who maintain that the epistemic status of a TBB need not depend
upon the agent possessing any independent grounds in favour of that belief.
Just so long as there are no grounds for doubt in this regard, then one can
acquire a justified TBB even whilst lacking independent grounds in favour
of that belief. The standard story goes that this camp of theorists gets their
inspiration from Reid.8 In its starkest formulation this thesis is more than
just the denial of global reductionism. Instead, it maintains something like
the following claim:
Bare Credulism
For all of one’s TBBs, one’s TBB can be justified even though one is
unable to offer any supporting grounds in favour of that TBB.
By allowing that one’s TBBs can be justified even in the absence of any
supporting grounds in their favour, the credulist is proposing quite a radical
thesis. After all, one’s TBBs don’t seem to be the sort of beliefs that one
would typically regard as forming part of one’s basic beliefs, at least on any
classical conception of that notion at any rate. They are not, for example,
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the kinds of beliefs that are typically infallible, self-evident, or incorrigible.
And note that if they were, then we wouldn’t need a credulist thesis to
explain their epistemic status since we could then simply appeal to one of
the classical foundationalist models of justification instead. The idea behind
credulism is that even despite being fallible, non-self-evident and corrigible,
nevertheless TBBs can have an epistemic status which does not depend upon
any further grounds that the agent possesses. Furthermore, this epistemic
status is meant to be robust enough to be worthy of the title ‘justification’.
This is a bold thesis indeed.9 In what follows, we will call any TBB that is
justified because, at least in part (the reason for this qualification will
become apparent below), it enjoys a default epistemic support a T-basic
TBB.
Essentially, then, the worry that reductionists have is that without
independent evidence there is no reason for thinking that a particular
instance of testimony is true—more precisely, there is nothing in an instance
of testimony which of itself indicates that it tends towards the truth. On this
picture, the credulists are simply offering a recipe for widespread gullibility.
In contrast, the credulists maintain that the reductionist model unduly
intellectualises TBB by denying even the possibility that such beliefs might
posses an innate epistemic status. By setting the hurdle for testimonial
justification so high, they argue, the reductionist walks right into the trap
set by the sceptic.
Of these two motivations, it is probably the reductionist rationale that
fares better on initial inspection. The claim that reductionism overly intel-
lectualises testimonial justification is not all that compelling given that the
reductionist demand that agents must possess further grounds in favour of a
TBB does not require any explicit inference on the part of the subject, nor
even any great intellectual sophistication (the claim is not, for example, that
one should run through an inference prior to forming any particular TBB).
The related claim made by the credulists regarding the scepticism-friendly
nature of reductionism is more cogent, but is also only of ambiguous import.
This objection emphasises our widespread cognitive dependence on testi-
mony, especially as children, to highlight the implausibility of the reductionist
model and show how it is congenial to a general scepticism about justifica-
tion.10 After all, if the reductionist thesis is that any justification for a TBB
must ultimately rest upon non-testimonial foundations, then it is hard to see
how the vast majority of our beliefs could ever be justified. Most of our
beliefs seem to be ultimately or largely testimony-based, and this means both
that the reductionist demand constrains the epistemic status of a large num-
ber of our beliefs and also that there are very few non-TBBs which could
serve the required supporting role. Together, these two factors ensure that
only a very restricted class of our beliefs is justified.
Take, for example, my belief that the earth is round. Although this
might not initially seem to be a TBB, since one isn’t typically aware of one
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explicitly being told that this is the case, a moment’s reflection reveals that
it is almost certainly a TBB since it could hardly have been gained in any
other way (by going into outer space to determine that this is the case for
oneself, for example).11 The problem is, of course, that it is hard to see how
one could go about acquiring non-testimonial grounds for believing this
proposition, since whatever further support one sought (e.g., from textbooks,
or from photographs that purport to have been taken from outer space)
would itself owe its epistemic status, whether directly or indirectly, to
instances of testimony.12 The same goes for many of our TBBs. But if
that is right, and if it is also right that a good many of our beliefs in general
are TBBs, then a fairly broad and disconcerting scepticism appears to
immediately ensue.
Opting for the credulist position enables us to evade this problem by
allowing our TBBs a positive epistemic status even in the absence of
supporting grounds, but now one has to deal with the very different worry
that afflicts this stance—viz., how could it be that one could be justified in
holding a TBB even in the absence of supporting reasons? Perhaps more
pertinently, the worry is in what sense we can call the default epistemic
status of these TBBs a ‘justification’ when there doesn’t seem to be anything
justifying the belief at all?13 In any case, it is hardly much of an objection, in
and of itself, to a particular epistemological view that it leads to scepticism,
since such scepticism could well be warranted.
On the face of it, then, it seems that the choice is between either an
epistemology of testimony (global reductionism) that makes plausible
demands on what counts as a testimonial justification, but which leads
directly to a form of scepticism about the epistemic status of our TBBs; or
an alternative view (bare credulism) that can avoid the scepticism, but only
at the cost of allowing us to be justified in holding TBBs even in the
absence of supporting grounds.14 The motivation for some sort of midway
account is thus very strong. We will begin by examining the prospects for
compromise from the reductionist side of the debate.
2. The Search for a Hybrid View (I)—Reductionism
One way in which one might qualify the reductionist thesis is to ‘local-
ise’ the central reductionist claim that it makes. That is, whilst one retains
the core reductionist requirement that one’s justification for one’s TBBs
must always be dependent upon additional independent grounds (i.e.,
grounds which are independent of the target instance(s) of testimony), one
drops the further demand that those independent grounds should be non-
testimonial. So, for example, one cannot be justified in forming a TBB that
P solely on the basis of hearing someone’s testimony that P, but neither does
one need to find epistemic support for that belief which goes beyond
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additional testimonial grounds (such as the testimonial ground from
another testifier that the original testifier can be trusted in this regard).
One can find an influential version of this view in recent work by Elizabeth
Fricker (1987; 1994; 1995).15
We can roughly formulate such a position as follows:
Local Reductionism
For all of one’s TBBs, if one’s TBB is justified, then one is able to offer
sufficient independent grounds in support of that TBB.
The attraction of such a view is that it lessens the counterintuitive
consequences of global reductionism. In particular, by dropping the demand
that one’s TBBs should always be supported by further non-testimonial
grounds we both weaken the intellectualism that is held to be inherent
in the view whilst also reducing its potential to generate sceptical
consequences.
The problem with such a position, however, is that insofar as one is
impressed by the considerations that led us to take the global reductionist
thesis seriously, then one will not be satisfied by this weakening of the view.
After all, for a wide class of our TBBs, the ‘independent’ support in question
will simply consist of further TBBs which require independent support and
which, moreover, will be ‘independently’ supported by further TBBs, and so
on. In all likelihood a circle of justification will form here, in that the
original TBB will at some point figure in one of the supporting classes of
TBBs, but even if this does not happen, we are still left with a regress of
justification, and that is hardly any better.16 It seems, then, that if one is to
motivate a suitable hybrid view then one is going to have to allow some of
one’s TBBs to have a default epistemic status.
One possibility in this respect, which retains at least the spirit of local
reductionism, is to allow that TBBs have a default epistemic status, but only
in the initial stages of our intellectual development. As noted above we
largely gain our beliefs—and our picture of the world in general—from the
testimony of others, and to insist on an unqualified version of reductionism
appears to make this kind of knowledge acquisition epistemically problem-
atic. One might contend, however, that one could consistently allow a
default epistemic status to one’s TBBs in this regard without thereby con-
ceding the core claim behind the reductionist thesis as regards the beliefs of
the intellectually developed. On this model, in offering independent support
for one’s TBB when one has passed the developmental stage, one may
adduce TBBs gained whilst in the developmental stage and which as a result
possess a default epistemic status. Accordingly, the chain of justification can
come to an end with a TBB that requires no further epistemic support
because of its default epistemic status.17
The Epistemology of Testimony 331
We thus get a thesis of roughly the following sort:
Local Developmental Reductionism
For all of one’s TBBs gained in the non-developmental stage, if one’s
TBB is justified, then one is able to offer sufficient independent grounds
in support of that TBB.
On the face of it, this seems to meet some of the problems facing both global
and local reductionism. On the one hand, we can account of our intellectual
development in a way that does not epistemically problematize our wide-
spread acquisition of knowledge via testimony during this stage. And, on
the other, we can also insist that once this stage has passed then one’s TBBs
must be placed under the scrutiny required by the reductionist model.
Accordingly, the kind of epistemic dispensation licensed by the credulist,
and which appears to allow widespread gullibility as an epistemic policy, is
avoided.
Crucially, however, local developmental reductionism is not really a form
of reductionism at all but a species of credulism, in that, in keeping with the
spirit of credulism, it grants some TBBs a default epistemic status. With this
in mind, it is better to situate this position amongst other credulist positions
rather than with reductionist accounts. This is what we will now do.
3. The Search for a Hybrid View (II)—Credulism
There are several ways in which one might modify the bare credulist
thesis. The most straightforward way is to weaken it by noting that in
coming by an instance of testimony, understanding it (or seeming to at
any rate), and recognising it as an instance of testimony, one thereby
gains some epistemic support for one’s TBB, even if that support is not in
itself sufficient for justification (so that further default support is also
necessary).18 After all, the mere fact that someone would be willing to go
to the trouble of asserting P at all is a prima facie reason for thinking that P
is true.
With this in mind, we can formulate a modest credulism as follows:
Modest Credulism
For all of one’s TBBs, one’s TBB can be justified even though one is
unable to offer any independent supporting grounds in favour of that
TBB.
The credulist claim therefore comes down to the thesis that one’s TBBs are
able to possess a default epistemic status which, along with the grounds one
gains for a TBB in virtue of it being a TBB, enables them to be justified even
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in the absence of further independent grounds—provided, of course, that
there are no grounds for doubt in this regard.
A second way in which one might modify the bare credulist thesis,
which is in the spirit of the local developmental reductionism that we have
just considered, is to place a restriction on the kind of TBBs that can be
granted a default epistemic status. For whilst it might well be true that there
is a standing presumption in favour of, say, a child’s reliance on testimony,
it is not nearly so plausible that such a default epistemic status should
transfer to very different cases where TBBs are involved, such as in murder
trials.19 This then motivates the idea that it is not all TBBs that have a
standing default epistemic status but only, at best, a specific sub-class of them.
Moreover, it is not as if one needs to allow that all of one’s TBBs could
potentially be T-basic TBBs in order to ensure that one can evade the kind
of sceptical worry at issue in the debate about global reductionism. Just so
long as a sufficiently large class of one’s TBBs are justified in the absence of
independent supporting grounds, then, at a formal level at any rate, the
possibility remains that the chain of justification that is in play in favour of
one’s non-T-basic TBBs, whilst it might not sufficiently go outside of one’s
other TBBs, nevertheless does ultimately end with T-basic TBBs which do
not stand in need of any further independent epistemic support for their
justification. In the case of the TBBs gained in the developmental stage,
and where no subsequent grounds for doubt in this regard have been raised,
this seems very plausible. I need to offer independent support for my non-
T-basic TBBs and, whilst at least a large part of this additional support will
be itself testimonial, just so long as it incorporates T-basic TBBs (such as
those TBBs gained in the developmental stage) in the appropriate way, then
this can suffice to support a justification for my non-T-basic TBBs.
We can formulate such a restricted credulist thesis as follows:
Modest Restricted Credulism
For at least some of one’s TBBs, one’s TBB can be justified even though
one is unable to offer any independent supporting grounds in favour of
that TBB.
Note that this formulation leaves it open as to which class of TBBs is to be
privileged in this regard. Moreover, this characterisation of restricted
credulism is also consistent with the point made earlier as regards modest
credulism that any TBB brings with it some supporting grounds, even if
those grounds are not independent of the instance of testimony in question
and even though they are not in themselves sufficient to support a justifica-
tion (which is why I have called it a ‘modest restricted credulist’ thesis).
Now one might argue that the difference between modest credulism and
modest restricted credulism is rather limited, in that even by the lights of the
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former proposal the claim is only that there is a default epistemic standing
for one’s TBBs, and thus it is implicitly incorporated into the view that there
may be a wide class of TBBs for which this default status is overridden.
Accordingly, one could treat, say, a developmental version of modest
restricted credulism as being simply a modest credulist thesis on the grounds
that there are always overriding considerations in play when it comes to the
TBBs of those who are no longer in the developmental stage.
This may well be true, although I still think that such a view would be best
expressed as a modest restricted credulist position. After all, the spirit of
modest credulism is that the grounds for doubt come from defeaters that are
specific to that particular belief, as when one is in possession of counter-
evidence against the target proposition. In the case we are imagining, however,
the defeaters are standing defeaters which apply to beliefs of a certain type
rather than being specific to that belief.20 It is thus more transparent to
formulate the position as a modest restricted credulist thesis rather than simply
as a modest credulist thesis. That said, we do not need to decide on this matter
here, since we can treat both of these formulations of the modest credulist
thesis as plausible ways in which one might refine the bare credulist account.
Nevertheless, this talk of defeaters does direct us towards a further
modification that we should make to the bare credulist thesis. The issue
relates to how it is part of the credulist view that one’s TBBs only have the
relevant default epistemic status provided that there are no grounds for
doubt in this regard. With this in mind, however, there is an additional
supporting ground in favour of the TBB which the agent does not gain in
virtue of receiving the instance of testimony at issue—viz., the ground that
there are no grounds to doubt this TBB. This ‘meta’ ground is ‘negative’ in
the sense that it is a ground for not doubting this TBB, as opposed to being
a ‘positive’ ground in favour of belief in this TBB.
With this consideration in mind, we can re-formulate the two credulist
theses just described as follows:
Modest Credulism*
For all of one’s TBBs, one’s TBB can be justified even though one is
unable to offer any independent positive supporting grounds in favour
of that TBB.
Modest Restricted Credulism*
For at least some of one’s TBBs, one’s TBB can be justified even though
one is unable to offer any independent positive supporting grounds in
favour of that TBB.
Note that in order to maintain the credulist thesis it is going to be essential that
this independent ground is, as one would expect, insufficient to justify one’s
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TBB, even when combined with the non-independent grounds that one gains
for one’s TBB in virtue of it being a TBB. If this were not so then the core
credulist claim that these beliefs have a default epistemic status would be lost.
We now have two fairly plausible renderings of what a compromise
position might look like in the debate regarding the epistemology of testi-
monial beliefs, at least where the notion of justification is concerned. We
have moved away from the austerity of the bare credulist thesis by acknowl-
edging the fact that agents will always have some grounds in favour of their
TBBs, even some independent grounds of a limited and negative sort.
Nevertheless, we have also retained the key anti-global reductionist claim
that there is a default epistemic status that accrues to at least some of our
TBBs in virtue of them being TBBs, and hence rejected the analogous
austerity of the global reductionist demand that our TBBs always be justi-
fied by appeal to non-testimonial grounds.
4. Internalist Versions of Credulism
We are not quite home and dry yet, however, since we still need to
identify what sort of epistemological thesis these credulist accounts are. In
particular, we need to decide whether they should be understood along
epistemological internalist or externalist lines. As we will see, this is easier
said than done. We will begin by considering the prospects for these
accounts when they are read as internalist theses.
We will define epistemological internalism about justification in the
following way:
Internalist Justification
An agent’s belief is internalistically justified if, and only if, the facts
which determine that justification are knowable by the agent via reflec-
tion alone (i.e., through a priori reasoning, introspection of her own
mental states, or memory of knowledge gained via either of these
means).21
Specifically applied to the issue of testimonial justification, we thus get the
following formulation of the internalist thesis:
Internalist Testimonial Justification
An agent’s TBB is internalistically justified if, and only if, the facts
which determine that justification are knowable by the agent via reflec-
tion alone.
And we will take epistemological non-internalism—i.e., externalism—about
justification to consist in the denial of this thesis, such that it allows that an
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agent can be justified without being able to know the facts which determine
that justification by reflection alone.
Although there will always be a certain amount of debate about how
best to draw this distinction, I think this characterisation is relatively
uncontroversial in that it captures the key sense in which an internalist
theory of justification demands a special kind of cognitive access on the
part of the agent to the relevant justifiers. Moreover, it also accounts for
how externalist theories, like reliabilist views, are externalist precisely
because they allow facts to count as determining an agent’s justification
for her belief (such as facts about the reliability the agent’s belief–forming
process) which are not knowable by that agent by reflection alone.22
Consider how the two versions of the credulist thesis that we have just
formulated fare if they are understood along internalist lines. To begin with,
note that all internalist versions of the credulist account face an immediate
problem regarding what the relevant reflectively accessible facts which
determine justification are. When it comes to the bare credulist thesis this
problem is particularly pressing since it seems as if there just are no reflec-
tively accessible justification-determining facts that are applicable to T-basic
TBBs. Moreover, since such T-basic TBBs are not usually of their nature
self-justifying in any way—they are not typically of their nature self-evident,
for example—it is not as if the relevant reflectively accessible facts could
simply concern the epistemic properties of the T-basic TBB itself. Accord-
ingly, it is hard to see how, on an internalist construal of bare credulism, one
could regard T-basic TBBs as justified at all.
On the face of it, the modest versions of credulism that we have formu-
lated fare better in this regard since they do make appeal to some supporting
grounds in their account of the default epistemic status of T-basic TBBs. On
the internalist view, these grounds will be understood in the standard way as
being reflectively accessible to the agent. Thus we have an account here of how
the epistemic support one has for one’s T-basic TBBs can be dependent upon
reflectively accessible facts which determine that epistemic support.
The problem, however, is that the relevant reflectively accessible facts
here only suffice to determine a positive epistemic status for the T-basic
TBBs. That is, they do not suffice, even by the lights of the credulist (indeed,
especially by the lights of the credulist), to determine a justification for the
T-basic TBBs. Accordingly, there is a lacuna in the justificational story on
the internalist construal of the modest credulist model, one that parallels
the lacuna in the internalist rendering of bare credulism that was just noted.
Put starkly, the worry about internalist construals of the credulist thesis
is that it looks as if nothing, or nothing sufficient at any rate, is doing
the work of justifying one’s T-basic TBBs, and if this is right then the
justification for most of one’s TBBs is lacking.
Moreover, even if one were able to adequately respond to this concern,
further problems would remain. In particular, note that one of the facts
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which is determining justification on the credulist account would be that
there are no grounds for doubt—i.e., defeaters—available. On the face of it,
this might not seem like a particularly problematic demand to make in that
it is quite plausible to suppose that this would be a fact that is reflectively
available to the subject. The problem, however, is that intuitively it is not
enough merely to be of the opinion that there are no grounds for doubt—
rather one also needs to be competent in forming judgements of this sort.
That is, if one were completely incompetent when it comes to assessing
whether grounds for doubt are present (one lacks skills for detecting
obvious deception, for example), then one could meet this constraint on
default epistemic status even though there are manifest grounds for doubt at
issue in that situation (perhaps, for example, the testifier is making a very
serious set of claims whilst dressed in a clown costume and tooting a horn
after each statement).
This worry is structurally similar to a problem posed by Matthew
Weiner (2003) regarding any local reductionist thesis that allows TBBs
formed in the developmental stage a default justification, which is unsur-
prising given that we have already noted that such a position is, in effect, a
form of restricted credulism. Weiner argues that this model of testimonial
justification will not work because it generates the counterintuitive result
that an adult and a child could hear the same piece of testimony and form a
TBB solely on the basis of that testimony which is, respectively, justified
in the latter case but not in the former. He claims that this is counter-
intuitive because if these two beliefs are to be accorded different epistemic
evaluations at all, then it should be the adult’s belief that is privileged and
not the child’s. His reason for this is that adults will typically have acquired
a discriminative capacity to evaluate testimony that children will usually
lack and he notes in this respect that the child in this case would be likely to
believe in the existence of Santa Claus on the basis of an isolated instance of
testimony (Weiner 2003, 261). It takes experience to be good at detecting
defeaters, and this is something that children lack.
Accordingly, when it comes to the ‘no defeater’ condition for internalist
testimonial justification it is not enough for the agent to merely meet this
condition by her own lights alone, no matter how incompetent her ability to
detect grounds for doubt may be. Instead, what we require of the agent is
that she is competent in this regard and thus, on the internalist account, this
will mean that she must have adequate grounds for believing that she is
competent. And since this is an additional fact which determines justifi-
cation, on the internalist account it will be necessary that these grounds are
also understood, in the usual way, as being reflectively accessible to the
agent.
Once one has imposed this further restriction on internalist testimonial
justification, however, then, as suggested by Weiner’s complaint against
local developmental reductionism, a problem immediately emerges for any
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version of the modest local credulist thesis that is cast along developmental
lines. After all, the whole point of this sort of position is that those in
the developmental stage lack adequate grounds for thinking that they are
competent in this regard—this is part of what contributes to the fact that
they are in the developmental stage. At the very least, then, internalism
about justification does not sit well with a modest local credulism under-
stood along developmental lines. Given that part of the attraction of credu-
list views is that they can explain how we can come to (legitimately) acquire
a wide set of beliefs about the world on the basis of testimony without being
in a position, at least initially, to offer independent grounds in favour of
those beliefs, this result is very worrying for the credulist.
Moreover, the problem at issue here extends beyond developmental
versions of the modest local credulist position. In order to see this, all one
needs to recognise is that the kind of reflectively accessible grounds that one
has in favour of one’s belief in one’s competence in this regard had better not
simply consist of further TBBs if they are to play the required supporting role.
For suppose for a moment that the only grounds one possessed in this respect
were themselves simply further TBBs. The question would then arise as to
one’s reflective access to the facts which justify these TBBs, and this will
include facts concerning one’s grounds for regarding oneself as competent at
detecting defeaters in the situations in which these TBBs were acquired.
Furthermore, it is not as if an appeal to further T-basic TBBs would help
in this respect, since even in this case one would still need to have reflectively
accessible grounds for regarding oneself as being competent at detecting
defeaters in the situations in which they were acquired, and so the chain of
justification would simply continue.
A regress of justification—or, failing, that, a circle of justification—is
thus starting to loom which is structurally akin to that in play when we
considered reductionist views. Indeed, as with reductionist views, one pos-
sible way of preventing this regress is to justify one’s TBBs by appeal to
one’s non-TBBs, but then one would be faced with the equally disastrous
prospect of the kind of limited scepticism that we saw above to be entailed
by reductionist accounts. It seems, then, that a limited scepticism faces us
either way. The moral is clear: insofar as one interprets this ‘competence’
constraint in a manner that is robust enough to make the epistemic
status that results when one forms one’s TBBs in ways that meet this
constraint a type of justification then one is presented with the sort of
worries about regresses of justification that the move to credulism was
meant to avoid.
An internalist version of the credulist thesis is thus faced with two key
problems. The first is to account for how one’s TBBs can be justified at all
by the lights of this thesis given that there appears to be a lacuna in the
reflectively accessible grounds that are supposed to determine justification
in this respect. The second problem comes in the form of a dilemma
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regarding how we understand the ‘no defeater’ condition. Either we under-
stand that condition robustly, such that it demands adequate reflectively
accessible grounds on the part of the agent for thinking that she is compe-
tent in this regard, in which case we are presented with the same kinds of
worries about circularity and regress that the credulist thesis was meant to
help us avoid; or else we interpret the ‘no defeater’ condition liberally such
that adequate grounds for competence in this respect are not demanded, but
then it looks as if there is now good cause to doubt whether what we are
proposing here is a theory about epistemic justification at all.
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider this last point further,
since there does seem to be an epistemic notion available here which is
weaker than justification that might be what we are left with on the liberal
reading of the ‘no defeater’ condition. Consider again the child and the
adult in the scenario that Weiner envisaged. Furthermore, suppose that
there are clear grounds for doubt present in this case—say, the ‘testifier’ is
finding it hard to suppress laughter whilst making the ‘assertion’ in question.
It is a defeater of this sort that the adult should be taking into account
when she forms her TBBs, and if she doesn’t give it due weight in this
case—perhaps because she just isn’t paying attention to the speaker, for
example—then this would count against her possessing a justification for
her TBB. We can account for this on the internalist credulist account of
testimonial justification by contending that she lacks the necessary reflective
accessible grounds for thinking that she has formed her TBB competently in
this respect.
Now consider the case of the child faced with the same instance of
testimony. As Weiner points out, if either of these agents is justified then it
will be the adult, and so it is implausible to suppose that the child’s TBB is
justified in this case. Nevertheless, there does seem to be an epistemic status
that is applicable to the child’s TBB that is lacking in the case of the adult,
and this is that we would regard the child as being epistemically blameless in
forming her TBB even whilst not taking into account this defeater. Unlike
the adult, who we think should have been more careful in the formation of
her TBB, we recognise that the child does not know any better and cannot
be expected to have known any better. She is doing the best she can, by her
lights, which is more than can be said of the adult, and in this sense she has
an epistemic entitlement to her belief. Nevertheless, since, ex hypothesi,
neither agent is justified in forming her TBB, the epistemic blamelessness
or entitlement that is accruing to the child’s TBB is a weaker epistemic
status than that at issue in a justification. At most, then, all an internalist
construal of the credulist thesis can offer is an account of the epistemic
blamelessness or entitlement of forming T-basic TBBs; it does not establish
a justification for those beliefs. Since it was the latter that was the goal of
the credulist project (at least as we have understood it here), this is not
enough.23
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5. Externalist Versions of Credulism
So if we are to make sense of the credulist account of justification, it
is essential that we interpret it along externalist lines. This conclusion will
not come as a surprise to many involved in this debate, since it is often
just taken for granted that a credulist thesis is tied, whether explicitly or
implicitly, to an externalist epistemology. Rather than get drawn into the
details of specific externalist renderings of the credulist thesis, we will just
say that what is common to all of them is the idea that, broadly speaking,
the reliability of the relevant belief-forming process can contribute to the
epistemic status of the agent’s TBB, regardless of whether the agent has
reflectively accessible grounds for thinking that this reliability is being
exhibited. We will leave it an open question how this ‘reliability’ is to be
understood, whether in terms of a modal condition, such as the sensitivity
or safety condition, or in terms of some kind of proper functionalist or
virtue-theoretic thesis, or in some other way.
Note that this externalist brand of credulism can allow that there will be
certain grounds that one will gain in forming a TBB simply in virtue of that
belief being a TBB, and it is consistent with this sort of view that these
grounds are understood internalistically as being reflectively accessible to
the agent. Nevertheless, the point remains that such grounds are, in them-
selves at any rate, insufficient to justify a TBB. On the externalist account,
what additional epistemic support is required to justify a TBB can come
from non-reflectively accessible factors, such as the reliability of the belief-
forming mechanism that is in operation.
For example, if I am in fact forming my TBB in an (externally) appro-
priate way then, even if I have no good independent reflectively accessible
grounds in favour of my belief—such as grounds for thinking that I am
forming this belief appropriately—my belief could still be justified. Thus,
the first problem raised above against internalist versions of the credulist
thesis, regarding the apparent lacuna in epistemic support, is met, since
there is no gap to fill on this view. That my reflectively accessible grounds
do not suffice to ensure a justification for my TBB is neither here nor there
on this picture, since non-reflectively accessible factors, such as the reli-
ability of the process by which I formed my TBB, can contribute to the
epistemic status of this belief.
Moreover, the second issue raised above regarding how one is to under-
stand the ‘no defeater’ condition can also be dealt with on this model. As we
saw, it is necessary that such a condition is understood relatively robustly if
it is to perform the required role in helping to establish a justification for
one’s T-basic TBBs rather than just the mere epistemic blamelessness of
these beliefs. It was hard to see how this demand could be met on the
internalist construal of the credulist thesis since insofar as this condition is
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understood as robustly as it needs to be then a regress (or a circle) of
justification quickly opens up that undermines the prospects for establishing
the widespread justification of our TBBs. On the externalist rendering of
the thesis, however, no such regress (or circle) presents itself because the
additional feature supporting the justification need not be specified in such a
way that the agent must have reflective access to it, and it was this element
of the view that was creating the regress (/circle). Accordingly, the second
key problem with internalist versions of the credulist thesis that we noted is
also met.
We do not need to get into the details of specific externalist renderings
of the credulist thesis in order to recognise, however, that such a view faces
some fairly pressing problems of its own. To begin with, note that an
externalist version of the credulist thesis will be unable to do any better
when it comes to our TBBs formed in the developmental stage than its
internalist rival. This is because, as we noted above, agents in such a stage
of development will lack the competency in evaluating testimony (and,
relatedly, defeaters) that comes with repeated exposure to instances of
testimony within a social milieu, and this is bound to undermine their
reliability in forming TBBs. At best, then, all we will be able to say about
the TBBs formed by agents in this stage is that these agents are epistemically
blameless in holding them, not that they are justified in holding them,
whether by the lights of an externalist or an internalist account of testi-
monial justification.
This is not the only problem facing externalist treatments of the credu-
list thesis either, since there are pressing concerns about whether we can
even make sense of the notion of externalist justification when it comes to
testimony. Of course, there are many who think that an externalist render-
ing of the notion of justification is never possible, as regards any kind of
subject matter, but that is not the issue that I wish to raise here. After all,
externalist treatments of justification do seem (or so I would argue at any
rate) very plausible in a wide range of cases, especially when it comes to our
basic perceptual beliefs. Here what is most important is, I would argue, that
the belief was formed in the right kind of way, regardless of whether the
agent is able to offer sufficient reflectively accessible grounds in favour of
that belief (such as grounds for thinking that the belief was formed in the
right kind of way).
Moreover, it is not as if in the case of testimony the externalist is
offering a ‘pure’ treatment of the justification of TBBs such that reflectively
accessible grounds play no role whatsoever (as occurs in the more proble-
matic cases on which the externalist/internalist debate focuses, such as
regarding the so-called ‘chicken-sexers’). In particular, on the view sketched
here some reflectively accessible grounds accrue to the agent’s belief just in
virtue of the belief in question being a TBB. Instead, the crux of the thesis
proposed by the externalist credulist is simply that, at least for some TBBs,
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the justification one possesses for one’s TBBs will be at least partly deter-
mined by ‘external’ factors (such that these TBBs would be unjustified
without the contribution of these ‘external’ factors).
Nevertheless, even if we grant the general plausibility of externalism
about justification and also note the ‘mixed’ nature of the externalist thesis
in this respect, there are still worries remaining about this particular use of
externalism. The worry concerns how TBBs are not obvious candidates to
be subject to the kind of externalist treatment that is needed in this regard.
In short, the worry is that the ‘mixed’ externalist treatment on offer does not
contain a robust enough internal component, but that if we were to enhance
the internal component to the justification then we would be back facing the
very same problems that afflicted the internalist versions of credulism.
In order to see this, it is worth contrasting a case in which an agent
forms a TBB with a scenario in which that same agent forms the same belief,
though this time via perception. Moreover, in order to keep the examples
constant, we will stipulate in each case that the epistemic support for the
belief is ‘mixed’ in the same way. That is, the ‘internal’ component will
solely consist of those reflectively accessible grounds that the agent gains in
virtue of acquiring the belief in the relevant manner, with the ‘external’
component making up the rest of the rest of the total epistemic support that
the agent has for this belief.
Imagine, for instance, that the proposition in question is that the agent’s
car is outside on the driveway. In the perceptual case, this belief is formed
via the agent looking outside and seeing what looks to be her car on the
driveway. In the testimonial case, in contrast, the belief is formed by the
agent hearing an apparent instance of testimony to this effect. In both cases,
we will stipulate that the agent has no other reason for thinking that her car
is, or isn’t, on the driveway. (Suppose, for example, that our agent’s car has
been away at the garage and she has no expectation that it will be delivered
back today, but no expectation either that it won’t be delivered back
today—she just has no idea when it is due to be returned).
In the perceptual case, it does seem entirely plausible to suppose that
the agent is justified in forming this belief just so long as this belief was
indeed formed in an appropriate way. If, say, the agent’s perceptual faculties
are functioning correctly within an environment for which they are suited
(the lighting is good and so forth), then this will (depending on the details of
the externalist theory under consideration) suffice for the agent to have a
justified belief in this respect. We would expect (and we may even insist) that
the agent also comes by some reflectively accessible grounds in favour of her
belief in virtue of gaining her belief in this way (the fact that it looks as if
one’s car is parked outside on the driveway is, after all, a prima facie
reflectively accessible ground for thinking that it is parked outside), but
we would not demand any further reflectively accessible grounds before we
would count this belief as justified. In particular, it seems unnecessary to
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insist that the agent has independent reflectively accessible grounds in favour
of this belief, such as grounds for thinking that she is indeed employing
reliable cognitive faculties in appropriate circumstances, or (in normal
circumstances at least) grounds for thinking that there are no defeaters
present.
The situation is very different, however, when it comes to the corre-
sponding TBB in this proposition. In this case we are to suppose that the
agent forms her TBB simply in response to hearing an apparent instance of
testimony to the effect that her car is on the driveway. Moreover, we are to
suppose that the epistemic support for this belief is due only to those
reflectively accessible grounds that the agent acquires in virtue of forming
that TBB along with the relevant ‘external’ facts demanded by whichever
externalist version of the credulist thesis is under consideration. The crux
here is that, intuitively, without independent reflectively accessible grounds
this TBB is not justified. If the only grounds available to the agent for
thinking that this belief is true are the grounds gained in virtue of the belief
being a TBB, then reliability in the method of belief-formation, however
that is to be specified, will not be enough to ensure that the belief is justified.
One way to see this point is to consider what each of these agents would
say if asked why they believe what they do. Whilst it seems unproblematic
for an agent to say that she believes that her car is on the driveway simply
because it looks as if it is there, it does seem highly problematic for that
same agent to say that that she believes this proposition simply because
someone told her that this was the case. Part of the point here is that, unlike
the perceptual case, it is hard to see what the testimonial reliability in
question could consist in if it did not manifest itself in further independent
reflectively accessible grounds. Whilst we can conceive of an agent exhibiting
a perceptual reliability without thereby acquiring any reflectively accessible
grounds for thinking that such reliability is being exhibited, how would one
exhibit a testimonial reliability without having such additional grounds? Here
the reliability is constituted by the agent’s ability to make sound judgements
about, for example, the testifier’s authority to make the assertion in question,
the plausibility of the assertion made, and the appropriateness of the testifier
making this assertion in this context (an instance of testimony that is apropos
nothing in particular is usually a cause for suspicion, for example). It is hard
to see how these recognitional capacities could be in play in the formation of
a TBB without this resulting in the agent acquiring additional independent
reflectively accessible grounds to back up the belief in question.
The testimonial example that we have just described is thus immediately
puzzling in that the absence of such grounds itself calls into question our
stipulation that these reliable testimonial belief-forming traits are present.
This is reflected in the fact that whilst an adequate response to why one
believes what one does in the perceptual case can sometimes be simply that
this is way things look, it is hard to see how the equivalent response in the
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testimonial case (i.e., that this is what I was told) would ever be acceptable.
In the perceptual case, such a defence doesn’t in any way call into question
whether one is forming one’s belief in an appropriate fashion, whilst in the
testimonial case, in contrast, it does.
Of course, we need to remember here that the apparent exception to this
are those TBBs that are formed in the developmental stage, which seem to
be unobjectionable even in the absence of supporting reflectively accessible
grounds. Here it can be appropriate to say that the only reason one believes
what one does is because this is what one was told. Crucially, however, in
this case it is taken as given that the reliability in question is not being
exhibited, since this is part of what constitutes an agent being in the devel-
opmental stage. Accordingly, there is no question here (at least on the
externalist account at any rate) of the agent’s belief being justified, and
thus no issue regarding how this relatively ungrounded assertion could call
into question a presupposed testimonial reliability. All we have here, as
noted above, is mere epistemic blamelessness, not justification.
If one is to advance a plausible externalist credulist thesis, it is thus going
to be essential that one insists on further independent reflectively accessible
grounds being possessed by the agent, and thus one must abandon the key
credulist claim that there are T-basic TBBs. When it comes to such ‘local’
beliefs regarding the location of one’s car, then one may well be able to
adduce independent grounds which are not themselves, at least ultimately at
any rate, TBBs. Perhaps, for example, one has personal experience of the
authority of this informant as regards assertions of this sort. The difficulty,
however, is that most of our TBBs do not concern such ‘local’ beliefs in this
way, and hence we are back to the familiar reductionist problem regarding
how supplying adequate justificatory support for one’s TBBs requires one to
cite further TBBs, leading to a regress (or circle) of justification. The sceptical
worry that results here does not afflict all of one’s TBBs, but it will afflict
enough of them to ensure that the scope of our testimonial justifications is far
more limited that we might have otherwise supposed.24
So there are also problems with conceiving of the credulist account
along externalist lines. And given that internalism and externalism are
exhaustive options in this respect, this means that there is a standing
challenge present to the justification for a wide class of our TBBs.25
Notes
1. This way of putting matters sets to one side those types of ‘testimony’ that raise
distinctive problems, such as, for example, insincere or unintentional ‘testi-
mony’. Although the type of testimony that will be the focus here is to a certain
degree a restricted class, it is more inclusive than the dominant account of
testimony in the literature that is offered by Coady (1992). This incorporates
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the requirements that the agent is authoritative about the proposition asserted
and that the assertion in question is relevant to the conversational context. See
Coady (1992, 42). This view is criticised and slightly amended in Graham (1997);
see also Fricker (1994).
2. For a contrasting view in this regard, see Audi (2002, 79). Note, however, that
by ‘reasonably’ here I only have epistemic blamelessness in mind, rather than the
stronger notion of epistemic justification (this contrast will be explained further
below), and so this feature of the characterisation of TBBs is not as restrictive as
it might at first appear. Indeed, on this way of understanding reasonableness,
this formulation of TBBs is consistent with the possibility that small children are
able to form TBBs.
3. That said, the use of memory in forming one’s TBBs may not be problematic in
this regard just so long as it does not contribute any additional information, or
at least any additional information which is not itself testimony-based. In order
to keep matters simple, however, we will set this possibility to one side.
4. What if my belief that you are a pathological liar is itself testimony-based? Even
here it would be problematic to regard the resulting belief as a TBB, because of
the essential role of memory in the formation of the belief. (Nevertheless, as
noted in the last footnote, there may be grounds to be more permissive where
memory is concerned). In general, it is worth noting that there is a continuum
here. At the one end of the continuum there is the drawing of obvious logical
inferences from what has just been said, which I maintain is consistent with this
restriction. At the other end, in contrast, there is the employment of a substan-
tive degree of collateral non-testimonial information, which I maintain is incon-
sistent with this restriction. In between there will be some ‘grey’ areas, especially
given the fact that what is an immediate logical inference from a testimonial
assertion when it comes to the Sherlock Holmes’s of this world may not be an
immediate logical inference when it comes to us mere mortals.
5. Reductionist views are also often refereed to as being ‘inferentialist’, but I won’t
be employing this terminology here because it tends to be misleading, implying
that the reductionist position goes hand-in-hand with the view that the epistemic
status of our TBBs must be understood in terms of the agent concerned making
an actual inference.
6. The passage that tends to be quoted in this respect is Hume (1748, 111), though
there are actually good textual grounds not to take this passage at face-value in
the way that it is often taken. For more on the Humean position, see Coady
(1992, chapter 2).
7. Or at least, reducible to grounds which the agent reasonably holds to be non-
testimonial. For some recent (and qualified) versions of the reductionist thesis,
see Adler (1994), Fricker (1994) and Lyons (1997).
8. See, for example, Reid (1970, 240–1).
9. In the contemporary literature, the credulist thesis is most often associated with
the work of Coady (1973; 1992) and Burge (1993; 1997), though in neither case is
the position stated quite as starkly as we have formulated it here. See also
Stevenson (1993), Foley (1994), Audi (2002) and Weiner (2003).
10. This worry about how dependent we are on testimony in our acquisition of
knowledge connects up with the point often made against global reductionism
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that it is unclear how we could ever learn a language and so understand the
instances of testimony in play if we were to pursue the epistemic policy that this
thesis lays down. This is one of the key claims made by Coady (1992) in favour
of a credulist model of the epistemology of testimony. The more general claim
that a good deal of what we believe is ultimately based on testimony is widely
noted. See, for example, Stevenson (1993, 437) and Sosa (1994, 59). This claim is
also a recurrent motif of Wittgenstein (1969).
11. Of course, one might have reasonably inferred this belief from other beliefs one
holds. Crucially, however, the ‘other beliefs’ in question here will almost cer-
tainly be themselves TBBs. Accordingly, this belief would also have been
brought about via testimony and hence, although it is moot whether this belief
would count as a TBB by the lights of the characterisation of that notion set
forth here (it would depend on how immediate the inference was from those
instances), it would be akin to a TBB in the key respect of being causally
dependent on testimony.
12. In the case of the textbook the testimonial support is direct in that this is itself a
form of testimony. In the case of the photograph the testimonial support is
indirect in that, intuitively at any rate, one can only regard the photograph in
question as showing that the earth is round provided one is also entitled to certain
further claims which will be inevitably testimony-based—e.g., amongst other
things, that it was taken from outer space and has not been interfered in any way.
13. I think it is telling that proponents of this sort of position often express the point
not in terms of justification but in terms of the weaker notion of entitlement. My
interest here, however, is in the credulist thesis as a theoretical alternative to
reductionism, and thus as a view about justification. Accordingly, I will set those
construals of the thesis that drop the reference to justification to one side. I
comment further on the contrast between justification and entitlement below.
14. For more on the main contours of the debate between reductionists and credu-
lists, see Fricker (1987; 1995) and McDowell (1994), though note that the main
focus for McDowell’s discussion, unlike ours, is testimonial knowledge rather
than justification.
15. See also, Fricker (2004). For two useful and recent discussions of Fricker’s local
reductionism, see Insole (2000) and Weiner (2003).
16. For a development of this general line of argument against local reductionism, see
Weiner (2003). For a critique of both local and global reductionism, see Insole
(2000).
17. Fricker herself expresses sympathy with this sort of proposal. See, for example,
Fricker (1995, 402–3). For recent discussion of this distinction between the
‘developmental’ and ‘mature’ stages in the light of the epistemology of testi-
mony, see Insole (2000) and Weiner (2003).
18. Of course, if one allows, with Audi (2002, 79), that one could gain a TBB
without recognising the instance of testimony in question as an instance of
testimony, then this variety of modest credulism would be unavailable.
19. I discuss the specific epistemological demands placed on testimony in the legal
context in Pritchard (2005).
20. Moreover, note that the class of beliefs at issue is defined non-epistemically.
That is, we are considering a case where the relevant class of TBBs which lack
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the default epistemic status in question is defined in terms of how they were
acquired in the developmental stage rather than, for example, in terms of how
they were acquired in epistemically sub-optimal environmental conditions.
Where the target class of beliefs is understood in the latter epistemic fashion,
then it may well be that nothing would be gained by characterising one’s modest
credulist thesis in restricted, rather than unrestricted, terms, but this consider-
ation does not apply here.
21. In both this characterisation of epistemological internalism and reflective access,
I follow the account given by Pryor (2001) in his extremely useful survey of
recent trends in epistemology.
22. For more on the externalism/internalism distinction, see the papers collected in
Kornblith (2001).
23. The thesis that justification should not be identified with mere epistemic blame-
lessness is commonly made by the leading epistemological internalists. For two
recent examples of this, see Pryor (2001) and Bonjour in Bonjour & Sosa (2003,
§10.1). The reader should note that I am not suggesting here that the notions
of epistemic blamelessness and epistemic entitlement are synonymous or even
co-extensive, only that there is no important difference between them in this
particular case because they are both clearly weaker epistemic notions than
justification.
24. Note that the further question of whether this limited scepticism will have
ramifications for our testimonial knowledge is moot on the externalist account,
since it is an open question on this view whether justification is necessary for
knowledge (although, for some of the reasons just given, it is more plausible, I
take it, to suppose that justification is necessary for knowledge in the testimonial
case than it is in other cases).
25. I’m grateful to the organisers of The Trial on Trial project—Antony Duff,
Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor Tadros—for inviting me to
address their workshops at the Universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow on the
topic of ‘Testimony’, since it was this stimulus that got me working on this issue
in the first place. Thanks also to Tony Pitson for discussions on the historical
background to this debate, and to Lizzie Fricker, Axel Gelfert and Alan Millar
for all their help. Finally, I am grateful to The Leverhulme Trust for the award
of a Special Research Fellowship which has enabled me to conduct research in
this area.
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